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For the last several decades, there have been two constants with respect to
the National Labor Relations Board. First, the modern Board has been
notoriously reluctant to use its rulemaking authority; until recently, it had
made only one significant substantive rule via the notice-and-comment
process. Second, commentators academics, lawyers, judges, and politicians
have issued a steady stream of calls for the Board to make law via rulemaking
rather than through adjudications, arguing for the rulemaking process on both
pragmatic and normative grounds. In recent years, however, the first of these
has changed: the Board has engaged in two significant rulemaking processes.
Each of these processes was both time intensive and politically and judicially
fraught, calling into question whether the Board can achieve the process
benefits of rulemaking in the current contentious political environment. This
Symposium Essay explores the extent to which the Obama Board has been able
to achieve the purported benefits of rulemaking, and therefore whether the
benefits of making labor law through the rulemaking process exceed the costs,
especially where the Board could alternatively make law via adjudication.
Assistant Professor, Seattle University School of Law. For their comments and suggestions on prior
drafts of this Essay, I thank John B. Kirkwood, William R. Sherman, Joseph Slater, and participants in the
Northwest Junior Faculty Forum. I also thank the editors of the Emory Law Journal for their excellent work
editing this Essay.
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INTRODUCTION
For decades now, academics and courts have been calling on the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to use its rulemaking authority, rather than
relying nearly exclusively on announcing legal principles through
adjudication.' This suggestion mostly fell on deaf ears, with the notable
exception of a 1987 Board rule governing bargaining unit determinations in the
health care context. But recently, the NLRB has promulgated two new
substantive rules through the notice-and-comment rulemaking process. First, in
2011, the Board issued a rule requiring employers to post a notice of employee
rights; this rule was intended to remedy employee ignorance of the rights and
protections contained in the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).3 However,
the Fourth and District of Columbia Circuits struck down the rule,4 and the
Board eventually withdrew it. 5 Then, in December 2014, the Board issued a
rule intended to streamline union representation elections. 6 The rule took effect
in April 2015 amid tremendous controversy, with industry groups filing
lawsuits aimed at invalidating it, 7 and both houses of Congress passing
resolutions (since vetoed by the President) disapproving the rule.
8
This Essay uses these two recently promulgated rules as case studies to
discuss the relative merits and drawbacks of NLRB rulemaking as compared to
1 See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Potential of Rulemaking by the NLRB, 5 FIU L. REV. 411, 414 &
nn.20 22 (2010) (compiling sources). This literature is discussed in greater detail infra Part I.
2 Mark H. Grunewald, The NLRB's First Rulemaang: An Exercise in Pragmatism, 41 DUKE LJ 274,
275 (1991). The Board has also issued a handful of non-substantive rules through the notice-and-comment
rulemaking process. Lubbers, supra note 1, at 412 (noting that the Board has "issued a smattering of
procedural, privacy, and housekeeping rules" during the last twenty years).
3 Notification of Employee Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 54,006 (Aug.
30, 2011).
4 Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. NLRB, 721 F.3d 152 (4th Cir. 2013); Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v.
NLRB, 717 F.3d 947 (D.C. Cir. 2013), overruled in part on other grounds by Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep't of
Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (overruling discussion of scope of Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinay Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985)).
5 Employee Rights Notice Posting, NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/poster (last visited May 9, 2015).
6 Representation Case Procedures, 79 Fed. Reg. 74,308 (Dec. 15, 2014) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
pts. 101 103).
7 Complaint, Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. of Am. v. NLRB, No. 1:15-cv-000009 (D.D.C. Jan. 5,
2015), ECF No. 1, available at http://www.chamberlitigation.com/sites/default/files/cases/files/2015/
Complaint%200--%20U. S.%2OChaber%20ofr%2OCommerceo20v.%"o20NLRB%o200% 028U. S./2ODistict%20
Court%.20fot %20the% 2ODistict%20ofr%2OColubia% 29.pdf [hereinafter Chamber Complaint]; Complaint,
Associated Builders & Contractors of Tex., Inc. v. NLRB, No. 1:15-cv-00026 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 13, 2015), ECF
No. 1, available at http://www.vorysonlabor.com/files/2015/01/ABC-v.-NLRB.pdf [hereinafter ABC
Complaint].
8 Infra note 100.
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adjudication in an environment in which labor law is heavily politicized. It
explores the extent to which the Board-a flashpoint for controversy-has
been able to realize the advantages of rulemaking over adjudication in its
recent attempts. 9 It concludes that whereas the Board's rulemakings have
potential to yield benefits, such as improved certainty and consistency for
unions and employers, those benefits can easily be overshadowed by the risk of
judicial invalidation on constitutional or administrative law grounds.
Moreover, judicial rejection of high-profile NLRB rules-particularly when
based on ideas with public resonance, like free speech-in turn feeds a
political narrative of an out-of-control Board that must be throttled by the
legislative and judicial branches of government.' 0 As a case-in-point, the
Board's notice-posting rule was struck down by the District of Columbia
Circuit as an infringement of employers' speech rights, and the elections
procedure rule has been challenged on the same grounds. In both instances, the
free speech arguments seemed to come as something of a surprise to the rules'
public proponents. This is not to say that the choice of rulemaking over
9 The phrase "Obama Board" refers to the NLRB during the Obama administration. When President
Obama assumed office in 2009, the Board had only two members, Democrat Wilma Liebman and Republican
Peter Schaumber. In 2010, the Supreme Court held that decisions issued by the two-member Board were
invalid because the Board lacked a statutorily required quorum. New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S.
674 (2010). Shortly thereafter, President Obama made two recess appointments to the Board, Mark Pearce and
Craig Becker; Member Pearce was later confirmed by the Senate along with Republican Brian Hayes. In 2012,
the Board again fell to two members, and President Obana made three additional recess appointments. These
appointments were later deemed invalid by the Supreme Court. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct 2550
(2014). However, the Board has included at least three Senate-confirmed members continuously since August
2013. See Members of the NLRB Since 1935, NLRB, http://www.nlib.gov/who-we-are/board/members-nlrb-
1935 (last visited May 9, 2015).
As under prior administrations, the Obama Board's decisions have frequently caused political
controversy. See, e.g., William B. Gould IV, A Century & Half Century ofAdvance and Retreat: The Ebbs and
Flows of Workplace Democracy, 86 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 431, 439 40 (2012); Wilma B. Liebman, Foreword,
Labor Law During Hard Times: Challenges on the 75th Anniversary of the National Labor Relations Act, 28
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. LJ. 1, 5 6 (2010) (characterizing political controversies related to Bush II and Obama
Boards as "a record accumulation of difficulties"). Some of these controversies have resulted in existential
threats to the Board. In recent years, Republican lawmakers have repeatedly called for the Board to be
defunded, and in 2011, Member Hayes reportedly considered resigning from the Board in order to deprive it of
a quorum and render it unable to act. Pete Kasperowicz, GOP Lawmaker: Defund the NLRB, HILL (Apr. 3,
2014, 11:03 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/govemment-oversight/202556-gop-lawmaker-defund-
the-nlrb; Melanie Trottman, NLRB Defunding Fails, but Agency Remains GOP Target, WALL ST. J. WASH.
WIRE BLOG (Feb. 17, 2011, 4:43 PM ET), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2011/02/17/nlrb-defunding-fails-but-
agency-remains-gop-target/; see also Steven Greenhouse, Republican Might Quit Labor Board, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 23, 2011, at BI, available at http://www. nytimes. com/2011/11/23/business/brian-e-hayes-threatens-to-
quit-labor-board.html.
10 See Thomas 0. McGarity, Administrative Law as Blood Sport: Policy Erosion in a Highly Partisan
Age, 61 DuKE LJ. 1671, 1679 80 (2012) (describing high-stakes rulemakings in controversial areas of law in
which politics dominates the administrative process).
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adjudication is responsible for the injection of these and other arguments into
the debate. However, incremental adjudications may run less risk of judicial
invalidation than rulemaking, which might reasonably lead the Board to
conclude that it should proceed via adjudication whenever it is free to do so,
given that the benefits of rulemaking may prove illusory. Further, the Board
has adopted adjudicatory procedures that mimic some benefits of rulemaking,
especially in high-profile cases. Thus, where the Board is free to choose
between adjudication and rulemaking, adjudication may be both the more
pragmatic choice and one that carries relatively little downside.
The Essay proceeds in three parts. It begins with a brief discussion of the
benefits and drawbacks of rulemaking versus adjudication and surveys the
literature calling for the NLRB to engage in rulemaking. Then, it describes the
Obama Board's recent rulemakings, including the early demise of the
notice-posting rule and the looming challenges facing the election-procedures
rule. Finally, it discusses what might be learned from the Board's recent forays
into notice-and-comment rulemaking.
I. CALLS FOR NLRB RULEMAKING
For decades, scholars and courts have debated the relative merits of
rulemaking and adjudication. "1 However, in the context of the NLRB, "debate"
is perhaps a misnomer: commentators have almost universally called for the
Board to exercise its rulemaking authority more often. 12 This Part explores the
reasons for this rare near-unanimity, which in turn provide the backdrop for a
more thorough exploration and evaluation of the Obama Board's recent
experience with rulemaking.
It is black-letter law that agencies have discretion to choose between
rulemaking and adjudication. In articulating this principle in SEC v. Chenery
Corp.,13 the Supreme Court generated a list of reasons that an agency might
choose to announce legal principles through adjudication rather than
rulemaking; these largely pertained to the need to maintain agency flexibility
11 See, e.g., Richard K. Berg, Re-examining Policy Procedures: The Choice Between Rulemaking &
Adjudication, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 149 (1986); Charles J. Morris, The NLRB in the Dog House Can an Old
Board Learn New Tricks?, 24 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 9 (1987); Cornelius J. Peck, A Critique of the National
Labor Relations Board's Performance in Policy Formulation: Adjudication & Rule-making, 117 U. PA. L.
REV. 254 (1968).
12 See Lubbers, supra note 1, at 414 & n.20 (accumulating list of articles calling for NLRB rulemaking).
13 SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I), 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947).
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when dealing with new or multi-faceted problems. 14 Nonetheless, the Court
also urged that "[t]he function of filling in the interstices of the Act should be
performed, as much as possible, through this quasi-legislative promulgation of
rules to be applied in the future."' 15 The Court affirmed this principle in NLRB
v. Bell Aerospace Co.,16 though it added, without elaboration, that there "may
be situations where the Board's reliance on adjudication would amount to an
abuse of discretion or a violation of the Act."'
17
As the Chenery II Court suggested, advantages of agency adjudication over
rulemaking include increased speed as well as the flexibility to adjust standards
as novel situations arise or as the agency gains experience.' 8 In addition,
adjudications may pose less chance of attracting political heat 9-though
NLRB adjudications, and even charging decisions, are far from immune to
political controversy. Finally, gradual changes brought about through
adjudications may be less likely to be overturned by courts, and, in any event,
"there is far more at stake when a rule is rejected by a federal court than when
an adjudicated decision is reversed.",
21
Yet, many have called for the NLRB to limit its reliance on adjudication,
particularly where it is announcing broad, new standards. They describe the
benefits of the rulemaking process as follows:
14 Id at 202 03.
15 Id at 202.
16 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
17 Id at 294.
18 This argument has also been advanced by numerous commentators. E.g., Lubbers, supra note 1, at
420 27 (listing applicable rulemaking requirements in addition to those found in the Administrative Procedure
Act); David L. Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative
Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921, 927 28 (1965).
19 See James J. Brudney, Isolated & Politicized: The NLRB's Uncertain Future, 26 COMP. LAB. L. &
POL'Y J. 221, 235 (2005).
20 Steven Greenhouse, Labor Board Drops Case Against Boeing After Union Reaches Accord, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 10, 2011, at B3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/10/business/labor-board-drops-
case-against-boeing.html (discussing the "political conflagration ignited by" the NLRB General Counsel's
decision to charge Boeing with an unfair labor practice after an executive with the company implied that the
decision to relocate work was due to union activity at Boeing facilities in Washington state).
21 Brudney, supra note 19, at 235; Note, NLRB Rulemaking: Political Reality Versus Procedural
Fairness, 89 YALE LJ. 982, 989, 993 (1980) (arguing adjudication minimizes conflict between the federal
judiciary and Congress); see also Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM.




* More & Better Information22: The rulemaking process allows all interested
constituencies to submit comments, and the resulting empirical record
could lead to better decisionmaking by the Board.23 In other words, the
rulemaking process allows for greater public participation than the
adjudicatory process-a feature that offers advantages in terms of
democratic process, as well as the final result. In contrast, adjudication is
limited to the parties before the Board, plus ainici. 24 Even where amicus
participation in adjudication is robust-and therefore yields much of the
same information that a rulemaking process would-there is some loss
from a public participation standpoint; ainici will probably be insiders, as
it is simply more difficult to figure out how to draft and file an amicus
brief than a comment. 25 Further, the Board's response to submitted
comments (both for and against) is likely to be quite thorough, which
might prompt "increased deference from courts."
26
* Forward-Looking Lawmaking27 : Whereas Board adjudications are
necessarily confined to issues that happen to arise and to be pursued by the
Board's General Counsel, rulemaking allows the Board to decide which
issues to tackle, when to tackle them, and how broadly or narrowly to
address them.28 Further, while these advantages relate to the efficacy of
rulemaking, one might also characterize this interest in terms of fairness to
regulated parties. In fact, as the Supreme Court recently emphasized, this
consideration takes on a constitutional valence; enforcement proceedings
premised on abrupt changes in regulatory policy violate parties' due
22 E.g., Berg, supra note 11; Brudney, supra note 19, at 235; Shapiro, supra note 18, at 930 32.
23 The Board is statutorily banned from hiring economic experts, 29 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2012), so one
advantage of the notice-and-comment process is an expanded opportunity for outside groups to submit
economic analyses.
24 As discussed in Part II, the relevance of amici submissions should not be understated. The Board
regularly issues calls for amicus participation in cases involving the announcement of new standards. See
Invitations to File Briefs, NLRB, http://www.nlib.gov/cases-decisions/invitations-file-biefs (last visited
May 9,2015).
25 See Arthur Earl Bonfield, State Administrative Policy Formulation and the Choice of Lawmaking
Methodology, 42 ADMIN. L. REv. 121, 128 (1990) (observing, in context of state agencies, that rulemaking is
preferable when many members of the regulated community are unlikely to have lawyers).
26 Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Defending the NLRB: Improving the Agency's Success in the Federal Courts of
Appeals, 5 FJUL. REv. 437, 457 58 (2010).
27 Bonfield, supra note 25, at 128; Shapiro, supra note 18, at 932.
28 Bonfield, supra note 25, at 128 (rulemaking is desirable because "[t]he agency may make that law
whenever it desires, in advance of any violations, and as a means of avoiding the occurrence of such
circumstances in the first place").
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process rights when they occur without reasonable notice. 29 To deal with
this problem, the Board sometimes uses adjudication to announce rules
that will apply only prospectively, meaning that they do not apply to the
party before the Board.30 But this forward-looking focus that essentially
repurposes adjudicative decisions as policy statements sits awkwardly with
the commonly understood purpose of adjudication: the correction of past
wrongs.
Stability & Consistency 3 1 : The Board has been criticized for frequent•. 32
policy reversals that tend to follow changes in its political composition.
For example, Professors Catherine Fisk and Deborah Malamud argue that
much of the Board's decisionmaking consists of ideologically tinged
policy judgments, and that it would be better if the Board acknowledged
that fact and accordingly turned to a non-adjudicative lawmaking
process.33 In addition, some areas of Board law generate a lot of litigation
because they are simply confusing or unclear; rulemaking could help
clarify the contours of the law.34 Moreover, rules might be more stable
than adjudicatory decisions, and policy changes would be more likely
perceived as legitimate when accomplished through rulemaking. This
stability could both improve Board legitimacy and improve employers'
and unions' abilities to plan for the future. In addition, it is easier for
29 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2318 19 (2012) (agency's failure to give notice
to television station that agency had adopted new interpretation of statute as forbidding "fleeting moments of
indecency" before bringing enforcement proceeding based on that interpretation violated the station's Due
Process rights).
30 NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 763 (1969); see also Bonfield, supra note 25, at 129.
31 Samuel Estreicher, Policy Oscillation at the Labor Board A Plea for Rulemaking, 37 ADMIN. L. REV.
163, 173 (1985); Peck, supra note 11, at 270; see also Bonfield, supra note 25, at 129 30; Brudney, supra
note 19, at 235 36; William B. Gould, IV, New Labor Law Reform Variations on an Old Theme: Is the
Employee Free ChoiceAct the Answer?, 70 LA. L. REV. 1, 42 (2009).
32 Peck, supra note 11, at 254; see also Gould, supra note 31, at 44 (arguing terms in NLRA "lend
themselves to policy judgments").
33 Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud, The NLRB in Administrative Exile: Problems With its
Structure and Function and Suggestionsfor Reform, 58 DuKE LJ. 2013, 2015, 2078 79 (2009); see also Joan
Flynn, The Costs and Benefits of "Hiding the Ball ': NLRB Policymaking and the Failure of Judicial Review,
75 B.U. L. REV. 387, 399 (1995) (arguing that the Board disguises policymaking in adjudications to prevent
effective judicial review or congressional oversight); Peck, supra note 11, at 257 (noting that "generalized
provisions" of NLRA inevitably require policy decisions).
34 Gould, supra note 31, at 42-43 (rulemaking is appropriate "where there has been enormous litigation
because of confusion about certain issues that come up time and time again," such as regarding the definition
of appropriate bargaining units within healthcare facilities); William B. Gould, IV, The Employee Free Choice
Act of 2009, Labor Law Reform, and What Can Be Done About the Broken System of Labor-Management
Relations Law in the United States, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 291, 337 (2008) (arguing that rulemaking regarding unit
determinations for multiple location facilities would reduce "wasteful litigation" and promote stability).
[Vol. 64:14691476
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Congress to maintain oversight over rulemaking processes than
adjudications.
This Part has briefly reviewed the overlapping and mutually reinforcing
reasons commonly advanced in support of calls for the Board to engage in
rulemaking. The next Part discusses the Obama Board's substantive
rulemakings and their outcomes, laying a foundation for discussion of whether
the Board has been able to realize the potential benefits of rulemaking over
adjudication.
II. RULEMAKING UNDER THE OBAMA BOARD
The Obama Board has announced two major substantive rules: one
requiring employers to post a notice of employee rights (the notice-posting
rule), and the other adjusting the various aspects of the NLRB election process
(the election-procedures rule).
35
A. The Short Life and Untimely Death of the NLRB's Notice-Posting Rule
In December 2010, the NLRB-then composed of three democratic
appointees and one republican appointee36 -issued a proposed rule that would
require employers to post a notice regarding employees' rights under the
3~7NLRA. Commentators had repeatedly called for the Board to enact such a
rule, dating back to at least 1987,38 and it was the second time the Board
considered rulemaking in this area.39 The first came in the early 1990s, when
the Board considered a rule that would have required unions to notify
employees of their rights to opt out of a portion of union dues; 40 following that
proposal, a group of professors petitioned for the rule to be expanded so that
35 Notification of Employee Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 54,006 (Aug.
30, 2011); Representation Case Procedures, 79 Fed. Reg. 74,308 (Dec. 15, 2014) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
pts. 101 103).
36 Members of the NLRB Since 1935, supra note 9.
37 76 Fed. Reg. 54,006.
38 E.g., Morris, supra note 11, at 38.
39 Lubbers, supra note 1, at 412.
40 This proposal followed the Supreme Court's decision in Communications Workers ofAmerica v. Beck,
487 U.S. 735 (1988), in which the Court held that the NLRA's language permitting unions and employers to
require workers to pay union dues as a condition of employment was limited to the portion of union dues that
was germane to collective bargaining and grievance administration. Accordingly, the rule would have required
unions to notify employees of their rights to opt out of the non-germane portion of union dues by mail or
notice posting. Union Dues Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. 43,635, 43,639 (Sept. 22, 1992).
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the notice would include a more general statement of employee rights.
4 1
However, the Board ultimately withdrew the proposed rule in 1996.
42
This time, the Board pressed forward and enacted a final rule.4 3 In
explaining the need for the rule, the Board cited the ignorance of many
employees of their rights under the NLRA, especially immigrants and
graduating high school students.44 The Board had elaborated on this theme in
its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, linking employees' ignorance of their
rights to "underutilization of legitimate workplace protests, of the voicing of
group grievances, and of requests for outside help from government agencies
or other third parties." 45 In addition, the Board observed that most other
agencies responsible for administering other employment laws require
employers to post notices.
46
Before enacting the final rule, the Board considered a number of objections
submitted during the rule's comment period coming both from individuals and
groups, and from Republican Board Member Hayes who also opposed the
rule.47 These objections raised both policy and legal questions. As to the
former, commenters variously questioned the Board's premise that workers
were unaware of their rights under the NLRA (and, consequently, whether
there was any need for the rule),
48 suggested the notices would be useless,
49
and argued that the rule would damage the American economy by prompting
employees to unionize or file unfair labor practice (ULP) charges.50 As to the
latter, commenters questioned both whether the Board had statutory authority
to enact the rule at all, 51 and argued that the rule violated employers' First
Amendment rights52 and Sections 8(c), 9, or 10 of the NLRA,53 among other
arguments.
41 Charles J. Morris, Renaissance at the NLRB Opportunity and Prospect for Non-Legislative
ProceduralReform at the Labor Board, 23 STETSONL. REv. 101, 110 11 (1993).
42 Lubbers, supra note 1, at 412.
43 Notification of Employee Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 54,006 (Aug.
30, 2011).
44 Id. at54,015.
45 Proposed Rules Governing Notification of Employee Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act,
75 Fed. Reg. 80,410, 80,411 (Dec. 22, 2010).
46 76 Fed. Reg. at 54,006 07.
47 Id. at 54,007.
48 Id. at54,015.
41 Id. at 54,017.
50 Id. at 54,016.
51 Id. at 54,008.
52 Id. at 54,010, 54,012, 54,014.
53 Id. at54,011 12.
[Vol. 64:14691479
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The Board did not reverse course in light of these objections. Rather, it
promulgated a final rule that both set the text for the required notice-a short
description of employee rights under Section 7 of the NLRA-and imposed
penalties for employer noncompliance.54  Specifically, failure to post the
required notice was an ULP in itself In addition, it could toll the statute of
limitations and provide evidence of unlawful motive in separate ULP cases.55
Each aspect of the rule was immediately controversial. For example,
commenters argued that the text of the notice should include information about
various aspects of employees' rights to refrain from unionizing. 56 In addition,
they argued that the Board's suite of remedies went beyond what the NLRA
allowed. 7
Ultimately, this rule was short lived.58 Business groups sued to overturn it,
and the Fourth and District of Columbia Circuits agreed with them, issuing
decisions resting on different rationales five weeks apart.59 First, the District of
Columbia Circuit struck down the rule on the grounds that it violated
employers' free speech rights, as guaranteed by Section 8(c) of the NLRA.
60
Its decision focused primarily on compelled speech precedents, concluding that
the Board's notice-posting rule was indistinguishable from these cases. 61 In
addition, the court held that the NLRB lacked statutory authority to toll the
statute of limitations for filing a ULP charge based on failure to post the
required notice.62 Then, having concluded that none of the three remedies for
failure to post the notice were permitted, the court struck down the posting
54 Id. at 54,006, 54,010, 54,029 30.
55 29 C.F.R. §§ 104.213 104.214 (2015).
56 76 Fed. Reg. at 54,020.
57 Id. at 54,032.
58 For an account of the timing of the litigation challenges to this rule, see Charles J. Morris,
Notice-Posting of Employee Rights: NLRB Rulemaking & the Upcoming Backfire, 67 RUTGERs L. REV.
(forthcoming Spring 2015) (manuscript at 2 n.5), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=2529699##. Professor Morris argues that both circuit decisions were wrong, a conclusion to which
I am sympathetic though I do not share his confidence that the Supreme Court would have upheld the rule.
Cf id. (manuscript at 4) (stating that "failure to seek certiorari review was a serious mistake").
59 Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. NLRB, 721 F.3d 152 (4th Cir. 2013); Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v.
NLRB, 717 F.3d 947 (D.C. Cir. 2013), overruled in part on other grounds by Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep't of
Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (overruling discussion of scope of Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985)).
60 Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs., 717 F.3d at 954, 964. After the Board withdrew its notice-posting rule, the
District of Columbia Circuit issued an en banc decision that limited the compelled speech holding in National
Association of Manufacturers. Am. Meat Inst. v. Dep't of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 22 23 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en
banc).
6i Nat'lAss'nofMfrs.,717F.3dat957.
62 Id. at 962.
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requirement itself, concluding it was not severable from the remedies portion
of the rule.
63
About a month later, the Fourth Circuit followed suit, also holding that the
notice-posting rule was invalid because it exceeded the Board's rulemaking
authority. 64 It construed that grant of authority-to "make, amend, and rescind,
in the manner prescribed by [the Administrative Procedure Act], such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of [the
NLRA] 65-narrowly, concluding that the Board could not create a new ULP
through rulemaking. 66 In reaching this conclusion, the court held that the
NLRB was confined to an "expressly reactive" role: "there is no function or
responsibility of the Board not predicated upon the filing of an [ULP] charge
or a representation petition." 67 Taken at face value, this vision of NLRB
rulemaking is a sharply circumscribed one: not only could the Board not create
a new ULP through rulemaking, it also could not take steps to prevent the
commission of existing ULPs.
68
The Board did not seek Supreme Court review of the two circuit court
decisions, and now simply notes on its website that the poster can still be
disseminated voluntarily. 69 In addition, it launched a smartphone application
containing information about the NLRA.70
B. The NLRB s' Election-Procedures Rule
In June 2011, the Board issued a second notice of proposed rulemaking,
this time concerning the Board's union election procedures. 7 1 After a
procedural stumbling block that ultimately resulted in the Board conducting
two full rounds of rulemaking,72 the final rule was issued on December 15,
63 Id. at 963 64. Concurring, Judges Henderson and Brown indicated they would have struck down the
rule as exceeding the scope of the Board's rulemaking authority. Id. at 966 (Henderson, J., concurring).
64 Chamber of Commerce, 721 F.3d at 154.
65 29 U.S.C. § 156 (2012).
66 Chamber of Commerce, 721 F.3d at 155 56.
67 Id. at 154, 162.
68 Id. at 162 (stating that NLRA "rights are not functions or provisions to be 'carried out").
69 Press Release, NLRB Office of Public Affairs, The NLRB's Notice Posting Rule (Jan. 6, 2014),
available at http://www.nlib.gov/news-outreach/news-story/nlibs-notice-posting-rule.
70 NLRBMobileApps, NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/apps (last visited May 9, 2015).
71 Representation Case Procedures, 79 Fed. Reg. 74,308, 74,311 (Dec. 15, 2014) (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. pts. 101 103).
72 The Board first held a comment period during 2011 and issued the final rule in December. Id.
However, a district court later held that the Board lacked a quorum when it issued the final rule. Id. (citing
Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. NLRB, 879 F. Supp. 2d 18, 28 30 (D.D.C. 2012)). The Board then
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2014. The final rule adjusted the Board's process for handling representation
petitions and related legal challenges in a list of ways. 73 In general, many of
the changes were aimed at condensing preelection hearing procedures that
could otherwise extend the period between the filing of a representation
petition and an actual union election.74 For example, the rule puts off the
litigation of certain issues until after the election has been held, requires the
party opposing the election (usually the employer) to identify key preelection
legal challenges in a single statement, and eliminates an automatic stay of an
election when the opposing party seeks discretionary Board review of a
regional director's preelection decision. 75 The Rule also requires the employer
to post a notice containing information about employees' rights within two
days of the petition filing, and to provide the union with employee e-mail
addresses in addition to their home addresses. 76 Taken together, the Board
stated that these procedures would result in "[s]implifying, streamlining and, in
some cases, bolstering" existing election procedures. 77 The Board further
explained that the rule served agency interests in efficiency, particularly in
light of technological advances, as well as employee interests in fair and
informed voting, and in a transparent and uniform election process.
78
There is a key difference between the Board's reasoning and that of
academics and unions who have argued that the Board should shorten the
union election process. 79 These commentators have focused in part on limiting
employers' opportunities to lobby their employees (through legal and illegal
means) to vote against union representation.80 For example, Professor
Benjamin Sachs has argued that employers have outsized influence over their
reissued the proposed rule in February 2014, and held a second comment period, while also reconsidering the
comments made during the 2011 rulemaking. Id. at 74,312.
73 Id. at 74,308.
74 See id.; see also Jeffrey M. Hirsch, NLRB Elections: Ambush or Anticlimax?, 64 EMORY LJ. 1647,
1654-64 (2015) (describing key changes in NLRB's election-procedures rule).
75 These and other changes implemented in this rulemaking are sunmmarized on the Board's website.
NLRB Representation Case-Procedures Fact Sheet, NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/fact-
sheets/nlib-representation-case-procedures-fact-sheet (last visited May 9, 2015).
76 id.
77 79 Fed. Reg. at 74,315.
78 Id. at 74,315.
79 See, e.g., Benjamin I. Sachs, Enabling Employee Choice: A Structural Approach to the Rules of Union
Organizing, 123 HARV. L. REV. 655 (2010); Kate Bronfenbrenner & Dorian Warren, The Empirical Case for
Streamlining the NLRB Certification Process: The Role of Date of Unfair Labor Practice Occurrence
(Columbia Univ. Inst. for Soc. & Econ. Research & Policy, Working Paper No. 2011.01, 2011), available at
htt://digitalconunons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgiarticle 1158&contextworkingpapers.
80 See Sachs, supra note 79, at 701.
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employees' decisions about union representation given their constant access to
employees during the workday, their obvious influence over their employees'
livelihoods, and their sophisticated legal "union avoidance" strategies coupled
with weak remedies for violations of labor law.8 ' Accordingly, Sachs
continued, minimizing the time during which an employer can bring these
tools to bear in its campaign against unionization is desirable because it makes
it more likely that employees will vote their true desires concerning
unionization.82
In contrast, the NLRB stated categorically that "the problems caused by
delay have nothing to do with employer speech, '8 3 instead linking efficient
election procedures with employee confidence in the Board. 84 The Board also
situated its rulemaking in history, noting its "decades" long practice of seeking
to decrease representation petition processing time, while also taking care to
note that its past success in this area did not obviate the need for continued
improvements. 85 Thus, for the Board members who favored this rule, it was
simple good governance reform aimed at improving procedural efficiency.
The Board's disavowal of any intent to limit employer speech is likely to
become a significant issue in legal challenges to the new rule. The argument is
anticipated in both the comments opposing the new rule and in the exchange
among the three Board members who voted in favor of the new rule and the
two dissenting members.86 In short, the argument is that shortening the time
between the filing of a representation petition (which may also be when the
employer first learns of the existence of the union drive) and the election
violates the employer's First Amendment and statutory rights to campaign
against unionization. This is either because the true intent of the rule was to
limit employer speech (despite the majority's statement to the contrary) or
because the rule will have that effect.87 More specifically, the dissenting Board
members argued that the time between the representation petition and the
election is a long-recognized "critical period" during which employer and
union communications are particularly salient. 88 This view is premised on the
idea that, although employers may communicate with employees about unions
81 See id. at 710; see also supra note 40 and accompanying text.
82 Id. at701.
83 79 Fed. Reg. at 74,316.
84 Cj id.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 74,439 40.




on a regular basis long before becoming aware of a union drive, the
representation petition will both sharpen the employer's sense of urgency and
permit it to discuss its opposition to the specific union that stands to become its
employees' exclusive bargaining representative. 89 Thus, the dissenters argued
that shortening this time period "essentially embraces an 'anti-distortion'
theory-justifying speech restrictions to prevent an 'unfair advantage' in
campaigning. ' '90
The Board members in the majority offered a multipronged response. The
majority began by observing that the "final rule does not change any rules
regarding speech." 91 It also argued that the rule left employers, employees, and
unions with "a meaningful opportunity" for speech, particularly given
advances in communication technology and the fact that an employer can
convey its views about unionization at any time, both before and after a
representation petition is filed.92 Finally, the Board distanced itself from
comments that urged the Board to expedite election procedures in order to
limit employers' opportunities to oppose the union drive, characterizing them
as "inappropriate or irrelevant reasons for wanting the Board to issue a sound
rule.,
93
I have emphasized the free-speech-related aspect of this rulemaking both
because of its prominence in the exchange between the Board majority and
dissenters and because the First Amendment is becoming increasingly salient
in lawsuits challenging Board rulemakings and adjudications-including in a
pending lawsuit challenging this rule.94 However, other comments focused
variously on every other aspect of the rulemaking, and the Board responded at
length in its final rule, which took effect on April 14, 2015.
95
89 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2012) (stating that a union elected by the majority of the employees within a
bargaining unit "shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit").
90 Id. (citing Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)). In addition to the First Amendment
argument, the dissenting Board members and some commenters argued that the revised procedures would
violate employers' constitutional due process rights. These arguments focused on the faster hearing timetables
under the rule, which the dissenters argued involved a "potential deprivation in every election proceeding of
the statutorily assured right of parties to full pre-hearing litigation .. and the fundamental right of an
employer to pursue its interests in maintaining autonomous control of a business operation in which it has a
substantial capital investment." Id. at 74,451.
9i Id. at 74,423.
92 id.
93 id.
94 Chamber Complaint, supra note 7, at 6 7; see also infrta notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
95 79 Fed. Reg. at 74,308.
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Within weeks of the Board's issuance of its final rule, several
employer-side groups filed two lawsuits to invalidate the rule.96 The lead suit,
filed by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in district court in the District of
Columbia, includes a suite of claims mirroring the arguments made by
commenters and the two dissenting Board members during the rulemaking
process.97 Namely, the suit includes claims that the rule violates the NLRA and
employers' free speech and due process rights, and that the rule is arbitrary and
capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.98 In addition, both
houses of Congress have taken action to nullify the Board's rule under the
Congressional Review Act,99 although the President vetoed the resulting Joint
Resolution disapproving the rule. 100
This Part has reviewed the Board's two recent rulemaking efforts. The next
Part offers some observations about the challenges that the Board faces in
realizing the benefits of rulemaking in light of the repeated calls for it
discussed above.'10 These observations are necessarily preliminary given that
the Board's notice-posting rule was struck down and then withdrawn before it
could take effect and the election-procedures rule has just recently taken
effect. 102
III. RULEMAKING'S RESULTS
This Part reprises the benefits and drawbacks of rulemaking that have been
advanced by courts and in the scholarly literature, as discussed in Part I, and
discusses them in the context of the Board's most recent rulemakings. It
focuses on whether the Board was able to realize the benefits of rulemaking
over adjudication as a lawmaking process. This discussion is necessarily
contingent; the benefits of rulemaking would be achieved far more easily in an
environment in which labor law was less politically charged or courts were
96 See supra note 7.
97 See Chamber Complaint, supra note 7, at 4.
98 See id. at 4.
99 5 U.S.C. §§ 801 808 (2012).
100 The Senate passed a resolution disapproving the Board's election-procedures rule, which was adopted
by the House and vetoed by the President. SJ Res. 8, 114th Cong. (vetoed Mar. 31, 2015); Memorandum of
Disapproval, 2015 DAILY COMP. PRES. Doc. 216 (Mar. 31, 2015). Under the Congressional Review Act,
Congress may nullify a regulation by joint resolution, subject to presidential veto. 5 U.S.C. §§ 801(a)(3)(B),
802.
101 Supra notes 22 34 and accompanying text.
102 Representation Case Procedures, 79 Fed. Reg. 74,308 (Dec. 15, 2014) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
pts. 101 103); Press Release, supra note 69.
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more receptive to Board policymaking. Nonetheless, it suggests that in an
environment characterized by intense and politicized criticism of the Board
and judicial hostility to Board policies-and considering that the Board has
found ways to import aspects of rulemaking into its adjudications-the risks of
rulemaking can outweigh its benefits when the Board is free to choose between
the two processes.
A. More and Better Information?
There are two aspects to the argument that rulemaking is superior to
adjudication because the rulemaking process is likely to yield more
information on which the agency might rely in making its decision. First, a rule
may be perceived as more legitimate when the public has had a chance to
comment, and the Board has considered and responded to those comments.1
0 3
Second, an agency might make a rule substantively better and explain it more
thoroughly because of useful information or perspectives received during the
comment period. 104
Indeed, the two recent rulemaking processes yielded a tremendous amount
of public commentary, which the Board duly considered and responded to as
discussed above. 105 In fact, recent technological advancements-notably, an
online system for submitting comments on proposed federal rules-has
potential to yield even more public participation than academics writing in
prior decades could have imagined. 06 The eRulemaking program, and the site
"www.regulations.gov," has helped tens of thousands of people to submit their
own comments on hotly contested rules. 107
By way of comparison, the NLRB's 1987 rulemaking regarding hospital
bargaining units yielded more than 5,000 pages of hearing transcripts and
103 See David Fontana, Reforming the Administrative Procedure Act: Democracy Index Rulemakng,
74 FORDHAM L. REv. 81, 102 04 (2005) (discussing, in the context of notice-and-comment rulemaking,
evidence that public participation in decisionmaking results in more public support for eventual decision).
104 See Beth Simone Noveck, The Electronic Revolution in Rulemaking, 53 EMORY LJ. 433, 436 (2004)
("Participation improves the quality of rules and makes regulatory rulemaking more legitimate and
accountable.").
105 See supra Part II.
106 Noveck, supra note 104, at 439 (arguing that, if structured correctly, technological advances in
rulemaking have the potential to be "revolutionary" or "the savior of citizen participation").
107 Cary Coglianese, Citizen Participation in Rulemaking: Past, Present and Future, 55 DuKE LJ. 943,




written comments. 108 That volume-while substantial-pales in comparison to
the volume of comments submitted on the two Obama Board rules. 0 9 To wit,
the Board received 7,034 comments on the notice-posting rule"10 and "tens of
thousands" of comments on the election-procedures rule"'-the latter in
addition to testimony offered during four days of public hearings. 12 However,
the effect of this change should not be overstated, as a large number of
comments were cumulative at best and sometimes identical to other
submissions. "1
3
However, this experience does not necessarily establish that
notice-and-comment rulemaking yields substantively more useful information
than adjudication. This is mostly because of the Board's practice of soliciting
amicus briefs, which contain much of the same information as would otherwise
be included in comments, when it is considering making a substantial
change."l 4 Of course, the Board is not required to solicit these briefs, whereas
the notice-and-comment process is mandatory; 115 likewise, it is possible that
comments might be aimed at a broader range of situations than ainicus briefs.
However, the Board's recent calls for amicus briefs, including in cases
regarding aspects of union election practices and procedures, have specifically
invited interested persons to submit wide-ranging briefs. 116 For example,
consider Specialty Healthcare & Rehabilitation Center of Mobile, Inc.-the
highly controversial so-called "micro units" decision-in which the Board held
that it would sometimes permit union elections among subgroups of employees
108 Grunewald, supra note 2, at 301.
109 Cf supra Part II.
110 Notification of Employee Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 54,006, 54,007
(Aug. 30, 2011).
in Representation Case Procedures, 79 Fed. Reg. 74,308, 74,311 (Dec. 15, 2014) (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. pts. 101 103).
112 Id.
113 See, e.g., SHRA[ A-Team: Submit Comments to NLRB on "Ambush Election" Proposed Rule,
PENINSULA CHAPTER OF SHRM (Apr. 2, 2014), htt://virginiapeinsula.shrm.org/news/2014/04/team-submit-
connents-nith-ambush-election-proposed-rule (calling on members to "copy and paste the suggested
comments below").
114 See Archived Notices for Briefs and Invitations, NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/cases-
decisions/invitations-file-biefs/archived-notices-briefs-and-invitations (last visited May 9, 2015); see also,
e.g., Babcock & Wilcox Constr. Co., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 132, 2014 WL 7149039, at *17 (Dec. 15, 2014)
(noting the Board had solicited amicus briefs and discussing arguments in union and employer side amicus
briefs submitted in response); Lamons Gasket Co., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 72, 2011 WL 3916075, at *2 (Aug. 26,
2011) (noting that Board had solicited amicus briefs and listing parties that submitted briefs in response).
115 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
116 Supra note 114.
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within a workplace."17 The Board's six-page invitation to file amicus briefs
discussed the issues presented in the case and the Board's reasons for
reconsidering its earlier standard, and it specifically invited parties to submit a
broad range of information concerning their experiences with the relevant
issues. 118 Put another way, the Board's invitation fulfilled the purposes of a
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and apparently satisfied the statutory
requirements for such a Notice.
Even if rulemaking does not result in substantially more information, it
could result in a final product that enjoys greater pubic legitimacy. It is
impossible to say in any individual case that the public would have regarded
either a Board rulemaking or adjudication as being more democratically
legitimate had it been the product of another process. This is because both
Board rulemakings and adjudications are often attacked as illegitimate by their
opponents. For example, employers attacked both the Board's (adjudicated)
presumptions regarding employee solicitation and distribution in hospitals and
its (notice-and-comment) rule regarding hospital bargaining units as being
insufficiently sensitive to individual circumstances " 9 so while granular
decisions can be attacked as leaving too much indeterminacy, broader rules
may be attacked for precisely the opposite reason. Moreover, it was certainly
not the case that the Board's two recent rules were generally received as
legitimate exercises of the Board's authority. Both rules were the targets of
strong reactions (one might say overreactions) from both liberal and
conservative groups, with the latter attacking the rules as illegitimate agency
overreach. For example, the National Federation of Independent Business said
the Board's notice-posting rule showed the NLRB's "spite for job creators by• ,,120
setting a trap for missions of businesses. And, writing in the National
117 357 N.L.R.B. No. 174, 2011 WL 7052274, at *1 (Dec. 30,2011).
118 Notice and Invitation to File Briefs, Specialty Healthcare & Rehab. Ctr. of Mobile, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B.
No. 174 (Dec. 22, 2010) (No. 15 RC 8773), available at http://www.nlib.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/
basic-page/node-3253/356-56.pdf
119 Brief for Beth Isr. Hosp., Beth Isr. Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483 (1978) (No. 77-152), 1978 WL
206686, at *6 ("The Board has not accorded due weight to the unique considerations inherent in health care
institutions which must act in consonance with the needs of their patients as those needs are perceived by those
who possess the medical expertise which the Board lacks."); see also Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 499 U.S.
606, 611 12 (1991) (rejecting employer's argument that the NLRA's requirement that the Board exercise
discretion in determining bargaining units meant that the Board could not promulgate an industry-wide rule
regarding these units).
120 Kevan Chapman, NLRB Overreaches its Authority with Punitive New Rule, NFIB (Aug. 25, 2011),
http://www.nfib.com/article/nlib-overreaches-its-authoity-with-punitive-new-rule-58046/ (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Steven Greenhouse, New Rules Seen as Aid to Efforts to Unionize, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
26, 2011, at BI, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/26/business/labor-agency-to-require-posting-
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Review Online, former Board Member Peter Schaumber described the rule as
"an unwarranted usurpation of congressional authority .... [that] undermines
the very purpose it purportedly serves."' 12 1 Similarly heated rhetoric surrounds
the Board's election streamlining rule, which the President of the National
Association of Manufacturers characterized as "rais[ing] serious questions
about whether the NLRB is advocating an outcome rather than acting as an
impartial adjudicator."' 122 Thus, the potential for NLRB rulemaking to result in
a final product that enjoys public legitimacy seems doubtful in the highly
politically charged moment in which Board actions of all stripes are likely to
be targeted with allegations of illegitimacy and union favoritism. 1
23
In sum, it is unlikely that the Board's recent experiments with rulemaking
left it with a more complete and useful factual record upon which to proceed
than it generally receives in high-profile adjudications. And, while public
participation in the Board's rulemakings has been robust-possibly yielding
intangible benefits in terms of democratic deliberation and legitimacy124 -it
unionization-rights.html (noting the U.S. Chamber of Commerce described the rule as a "gift[]' to "organized
labor"); Press Release, Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs., Manufacturers File Lawsuit to Stop NLRB's Overreach (Sept. 10,
2011), available at http://www.nam.org/Newsroom/Press-Releases/2011 09/Manufacturers-File-Lawsuit-to-
Stop-NLRBs-Overreach/ ("This rule is just another example of the Board's aggressive overreach to insert itself
into the day-to-day decisions of businesses exerting powers it doesn't have." (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
121 Peter Schaumber, The NLRB's Unlawful Rule, NAT'L REV. ONLINE (Sept. 2, 2011, 4:00 AM),
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/276116/nlrbs-unlawful-rule-peter-schaumber.
122 Press Release, Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs., NLRB: If at First You Don't Succeed, Try Again (Dec. 12, 2014),
http://www.nam.org/Newsroom/Press-Releases/2014/12/NLRB-If-at-First-You-Dont-Succeed-Try-Again/; see
also Press Release, Nat'l Right to Work Legal Def Found., Inc., New Regulations Would Allow Union Bosses
to Ambush Workers Into Forced-Dues-Paying Ranks (Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.nrtw.org/en/press/
2014/12/worker-advocate-blasts-obama-nlrb-ambush-elections-12122014 ("Christmas came early for Big
Labor as the Obama Labor Board has once again given union bosses increased power to ambush workers into
dues-paying union ranks.").
123 This is not to say that Board adjudications are likely to be regarded as any more legitimate than
rulemakings. Recent high-profile Board decisions, and even procedural steps short of decisions, such as the
General Counsel's recent issuance of a complaint charging McDonald's corporation as a joint employer with
several of its franchises, have also been targets for charges of illegitimacy. See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse,
McDonalds Ruling Could Open Doors for Unions, N.Y. TIMEs, July 30, 2014, at BI, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/business/nlrb-holds-mcdonalds-not-just-franchisees-liable-for-worker-
treatment.html (quoting National Retail Federation official as saying the Board is "just a government agency
that serves as an adjunct for organized labor").
124 The benefits of public participation in democratic discourse are beyond the scope of this Essay, though
others have argued that these benefits are significant. See, e.g., Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of
Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REv. 342, 374 (2004)
("[T]he overall goal of participation [in administrative governance] is broader than simply ensuring the
achievement of policy goals; it enhances the ability of citizens to participate in political and civic life."). I have
previously discussed aspects of this issue in the labor organizing context. See Charlotte Garden, Labor Values
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seems at best doubtful that the increased opportunity for public participation
has resulted in improved public perception of the legitimacy of the final
product. Instead, heightened political polarization means that virtually any
Board action is likely to result in charges of illegitimacy and, if anything, the
rulemaking process provides a more focused target for opponents.
B. Forward-Looking Lawmaking?
A second set of reasons often advanced for rulemaking centers on the
opportunity for the Board to set its own top priorities and then deal with them
in a comprehensive way that ensures adequate advance notice to affected
parties, rather than simply deciding cases that happen to be filed by parties and
pursued by NLRB regional directors or the Board's General Counsel.
Conversely, adjudication can permit gradual responses to new or complex
problems, and deflect political heat. This set of benefits and drawbacks-in a
sense, mirror images of each other-is reflected in the Board's recent
rulemakings.
First, consider the Board's election-procedures rule. While the Board can
and does adjust some aspects of election procedures by adjudication, as well as
by simply changing its own internal practice, it would undoubtedly be difficult
for the Board to make a suite of simultaneous changes through any mechanism
but rulemaking; among other impediments, those procedures that are set forth
in the Code of Federal Regulations may only be changed via rulemaking.125
Thus, once the Board set streamlining election procedures as a priority, it had
to further choose between a single rulemaking or a less comprehensive series
of adjustments to its procedures in disparate proceedings, which could include
not only adjudications but also guidance documents and changes to internal
case-handling procedures. 1
26
The advantages of proceeding by a single rulemaking rather than a series of
piecemeal steps-for the Board and for workers, unions, and employers-are
evident. Putting aside the substantive results of the two processes, compliance
with a single rule that clearly sets forth the new process is far easier (especially
for an unrepresented employer) than tracking a series of decisions and internal
process changes that may be located in different places. And, for the Board,
are First Amendment Values: Why Union Comprehensive Campaigns are Protected Speech, 79 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2617, 2652 58 (2011).
125 See29 C.F.R. § 101. 17 (2015).
126 See Gould, supra note 34, at 341 (discussing adoption of internal deadlines for processing cases).
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rulemaking could prompt more comprehensive consideration of how a set of
changes will work together.
Yet, it is the comprehensive nature of the rule's changes that has ratcheted
up public and political attention-it defies imagination that a series of small
administrative adjustments could maintain the public's (and lawmakers')
attention over time. To be sure, there may have been significant reaction to
certain aspects of the new rule-for example, the new requirement that
employers include employees' e-mail addresses with the Excelsior list-no
matter how they were implemented. 127 But it is doubtful that other aspects of
the rule, considered alone, would have received the same attention. Relatedly,
the crux of the pending lawsuit aimed at invalidating the election-procedures
rule is that the changes, taken together, deprive employers of adequate
opportunity to oppose a union drive and to due process. 12 While employers
likely would have also challenged smaller, piecemeal changes, their charge-
that the new election rule significantly shortens the overall election
timeframe-would have had less force in the context of individual changes. To
put it bluntly, the Board's rulemaking will have significantly greater impact
than a more piecemeal course of action would have, but only if it survives the
gauntlet of judicial challenges and congressional review.
Hindsight suggests a similar dynamic regarding the Board's notice-posting
rule. Consider a counterfactual scenario in which the Board had begun by
building on its existing practice of requiring employers who have committed
ULPs to post notices regarding employees' labor rights as part of the remedy.
That might have led the Board to begin requiring employers to post notices in
cases involving pending elections, as it has now done as part of the
election-procedures rule. Or, the Board might have provided employers
charged with ULPs an incentive to post notices while the charges were
pending, perhaps by offering a procedural advantage to employers who agreed
to do so.
One can imagine any number of ways in which the Board might have
gradually expanded the universe of employers required to post notices-the
point is that a gradual expansion might have met with a kinder reception in the
127 This change has been the subject of particular public attention. See, e.g., Editorial, Quickie Gifts to Big
Labor, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 2014, at A12, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/quickie-gifts-to-big-
labor-1418429121.
128 Chamber Complaint, supra note 7, at 2 (describing the rule as implementing "sweeping changes" and
"rapidly (and needlessly) accelerating the election process").
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appellate courts. In fact, in National Association of Manufacturers v. NLRB,
the District of Columbia Circuit implied that it may have come out differently
in a case where a posted notice was required because "employers are
misleading employees about their rights under" the NLRA. 129 Had the court
considered (and approved) a rule arising in that context, it would have created
notice-friendly precedent on which the Board could then build. This would
have left the Board in a more favorable position that the one in which it now
finds itself; contending with negative precedent from the Fourth and District of
Columbia Circuits as it attempts to defend the notice-posting aspect of its
election-procedures rule (a fact not lost on the plaintiffs in Chamber of
Commerce of the U.S. ofAmerica v. NLRB). 1
30
To be clear, this is not to argue that the public is better off if the Board
makes incremental changes in order to avoid public or court scrutiny-that
question involves weighing the benefits of the substantive rule changes (which
will be positive from some perspectives, and negative from others) against the
loss of advance notice, transparency, and ease of compliance. Rather, it is
simply to make the point that from the Board's perspective, recent experience
suggests that the benefits of rulemaking can easily be rendered illusory.
Further, the Board has been able to mitigate some of the costs of adjudication,
particularly in terms of providing fair notice to regulated entities, through its
practice of issuing decisions that apply only prospectively in cases adopting
new interpretations of the law. 131
C. Stability and Consistency?
A third and final set of reasons often advanced for rulemaking over
adjudication concerns relative stability and longevity of rules over adjudicated
decisions. Rules are both procedurally harder for agencies to reverse and
perhaps less amenable to gradual drifts in meaning or application. In addition,
129 717 F.3d 947, 959 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 2013), overruled in part on other grounds by Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S.
Dep't of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (overruling discussion of scope of Zauderer v. Office
of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985)).
130 Chamber Complaint, supra note 7, at 15 (alleging that the elections procedures rule violates the First
Amendment "by compelling employers to engage in certain speech during the election process, specifically a
new mandatory workplace notice to be posted after the filing of the representation petition").
131 See, e.g., Babcock & Wilson Constr. Co., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 132, 2014 WL 7149039, at *19 (Dec. 15,
2014) (adopting new standard for Board deferral to arbitral decisions, but holding that the new standard will
apply only prospectively in interest of fairness); Alan Ritchey, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 40, 2012 WL 6800789




it is easier for Congress to maintain oversight over rules, helping to ensure
better consistency between agency practice and statutory requirements.
Will the Board's election-procedures rule be less amenable to change than
its adjudicated rules? It is possible that time will tell, if the rule is upheld by
the courts and left unchanged by Congress. Of course the notice-posting rule's
early demise at the hands of the District of Columbia and Fourth Circuits
means that rule provides little useful data on this point.
The notice-posting rule does, however, offer some lessons on congressional
oversight, as Republicans in Congress have launched multiple attempts to
legislatively reverse the Board. 13 2 Before the appellate courts ruled and the
Board withdrew the rule, the Republican-led House Committee on Education
and the Workforce held a hearing about that rule, 133 and House and Senate
Republicans introduced at least three bills to undo it, 134 in addition to a House
bill to remove the Board's rulemaking authority altogether, 135  and budget
proposal to defund the Board.136 (The latter two were only partially in response
to the notice-posting rule.)
The Board's election-procedures rule has received similar treatment-it has
already been the subject of multiple congressional hearings, 137 and a resolution
132 As this section details, Congress engaged in significant debate over the Board's recent rulemakings.
However, this is not to suggest that Congress has typically ignored Board adjudication. To the contrary,
congressional hearings have been held regarding both Board decisions and on complaints issued by the
Board's General Counsel. For example, Specialty Healthcare was discussed during a hearing of the House
Subcommittee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions. The Future of Union Organizing: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Health, Emp 't, Labor, and Pensions of the H. Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, 113th
Cong. (2013), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113hhrg82792/pdf/CHRG-
113hhrg82792.pdf Likewise, the General Counsel's decision to issue a complaint alleging that Boeing opened
a factory in South Carolina in order to retaliate against workers' collective action in Washington state was the
subject of both congressional hearings and proposed legislation. See Congressional Correspondence in the
Boeing Case, NLRB, http://www.nlib.gov/news-outreach/fact-sheets/fact-sheet-archives/boeing-complaint-
fact-sheet/congressional (last visited May 9, 2015); see also H.R. 2587, 112th Cong. (2011).
133 Culture of Union Favoritism: RecentActions of the National Labor Relations Board: Hearing Before
the H. Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, 112th Cong. (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
pkg/CHRG-1 12hhrg68366/pdf/CHRG-1 12hhrg68366.pdf
134 H.R. 2833, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 2854, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 1666, 112th Cong. (2011).
135 H.R. 2978, 112th Cong. (2011).
136 157 CONG. REc. 2181 (2011).
137 Rushing Union Elections: Protecting the Interests of Big Labor at the Expense of Workers' Free
Choice: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, 112th Cong. (2011), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg67240/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg67240.pdf; Press Release, U.S.
House of Representatives Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce Comm., Committee Examines NLRB Ambush




expressing the disapproval of both houses of Congress. 138  Of course, the
outcome of these efforts is still indeterminate-and, as Cynthia Estlund has
documented, statutory change in the area of labor law is nearly impossible. 1
39
Thus, while the Board's recent rulemakings have drawn considerable
congressional ire, they are unlikely to result in major statutory change.
CONCLUSION
The District of Columbia Circuit began its opinion in National Association
of Manufacturers v. NLRB by observing that the "Board's action departs from
its historic practice." 40 Given the decision that followed, one might be inclined
to read a follow-up question-why now?-into this statement. Or, to put a
finer point on it, eighty years of resisting pressure to engage in rulemaking has
left the current Board in a difficult position: deviation from that well-trod path
risks charges of activism, but continuing on that path means more of the same
criticism.
At the same time, one of the greatest threats to the Obama Board's
regulatory agenda is entirely external to the choice of rulemaking or
adjudication-it is the risk of judicial invalidation. While the merits of judicial
challenges to the Board's recent rules are mostly beyond the scope of this
Essay, it may be a fruitful avenue for future research. In particular, it is
significant that recent Supreme Court rulings, including Citizens United v.
141 142FEC 1 and Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., have opened new avenues for
employers to challenge Board actions on First Amendment grounds. 143 The
138 Supra note 100.
139 Estlund, supra note 21, at 1532 44 (discussing decades-long imperviousness of labor law to statutory
change).
140 717 F.3d 947, 949 (D.C. Cir. 2013), overruled in part on other grounds by Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S.
Dep't of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (overruling discussion of scope of Zauderer v. Office
of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985)).
14i 558U.S. 310 (2010).
142 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
143 I discuss some of these arguments in Charlotte Garden, Citizens United and the First Amendment of
Labor Law, 43 STETSON L. REV. 571 (2014); see also Robert Post & Amanda Shanor, Adam Smith's First
Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 165 (2015) (discussing impact of recent First Amendment cases, including
Citizens United and Sorrell, on commercial speech doctrine); John C. Coates IV, Corporate Speech & the First
Amendment: History, Data, & Implications (unpublished manuscript) (manuscript at 1 2), available at
htt://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstmct id2566785 ("Nearly half of First Amendment legal
challenges now benefit business corporations and trade groups... Such cases represent examples of a
particular kind of corruption, defined here as a form of rent seeking: the use of legal tools by business
managers in specific cases to entrench reregulation in their personal interests at the expense of shareholders,
consumers, and employees.").
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result is that invalidation by the judiciary has become a preferred method of
undoing Board lawmaking, overtaking other avenues of oversight (including
congressional oversight or popular disapproval). This dynamic is likely to
continue to impact the efficacy of NLRB lawmaking of all types. As a result,
the benefits that are likely to be achieved through the choice of rulemaking
over adjudication are limited, particularly given the Board's efforts to make the
adjudication process in controversial cases more like a rulemaking process.
Thus, the Board's recent experience with this judicial bottleneck will likely
drive it away from onerous and risky rulemaking, and back to familiar (if still
often risky) adjudication.
